CASE STUDY ANTA Sports: The making of a global multi-brand machine

In December 2018, when a consortium led by ANTA Sports Products Limited went shopping for Amer Sports Corporation with a €4.6 billion cash offer, the deal looked less like globalization than audacity. Amer’s roster read like a greatest-hits list for serious athletes and outdoor obsessives: Arc’teryx, Salomon, Wilson. Yet the Finnish holding company was facing profitability challenges, and ANTA – still widely seen as a Chinese mid-market manufacturer – had little brand oxygen outside Asia.

Six years on, the wager reads differently. ANTA’s group revenue climbed to RMB 80.2 billion in FY2025. Amer Sports, under its new owners, posted a record $6.6 billion that year, up 26.7 percent. Arc’teryx became one of the decade’s defining outdoor labels. And ANTA has since taken a €1.5 billion stake in PUMA, a move that makes it the German brand’s largest shareholder.

The transformation had its public coronations. At the Milano Cortina 2026 Winter Olympics in February, ANTA deployed its full portfolio in real time: the flagship ANTA brand outfitting ten Chinese national teams across short-track speed skating, speed skating, skeleton, figure skating, curling, bobsleigh and luge; FILA China equipping the freestyle skiing aerials team; Descente China providing technical gear for both the alpine skiing and snowboard half-pipe squads. Separately, ANTA secured the role of Gold Partner and Official Sportswear Partner of the Hellenic Olympic Committee, dressing the Greek delegation, which by tradition enters the stadium first.

Two months later, in late April, the BBC published a major feature examining ANTA’s global ambitions and the structural challenge it poses to Western incumbents: the kind of editorial attention that marks a company’s arrival in the international mainstream.

This case study follows the mechanics behind that transformation: how ANTA built its multi-brand portfolio, why the machine keeps working, and what its expansion means for competitors, retailers and investors now sharing the same playing field.

• The blueprint behind ANTA’s multi-brand growth
• The build of the model
• How the model works
• By the numbers
• ANTA benefits from several structural tailwinds at once
• ANTA’s portfolio machine starts to pressure Western brands
• The open questions
• Excursus: is ANTA the new BYD? 

The blueprint behind ANTA’s multi-brand growth

ANTA’s operating philosophy is stated formally in its annual reports as “single-focus, multi-brand, globalization.” In practice, it translates into three structural moves, executed in sequence: 1. Acquire brands at distressed or underutilized valuations. 2. Transform them through direct-to-consumer (DTC) channel control and Greater China distribution deployment. 3. Recycle the capital gains through public listings to fund the next acquisition.

The framework did not emerge fully formed. It was learned iteratively, beginning with the 2009 acquisition of the FILA China licensing rights from Belle International and refined through a decade of brand-by-brand execution. Each deal pushed the portfolio further up the value chain.

The model is structurally unusual because it combines a vertically integrated domestic manufacturing and retail base in China, with a policy of brand independence at the acquired-entity level. 

ANTA does not collapse acquired brands into a central structure. It preserves management, design autonomy and brand identity. The acquired brand’s premium positioning is the asset; diluting it would defeat the purpose.

The build of the model

ANTA was founded in 1991 in Jinjiang, Fujian Province, by Ding Shizhong and his family. Jinjiang was already a specialized manufacturing hub for global footwear brands.

It began as an original equipment manufacturer, then made its first strategic pivot in 1999: signing table tennis champion Kong Linghui as brand ambassador and investing in national television advertising.

The brand’s revenue reportedly grew from roughly RMB 20 million (€2.6 million) to more than RMB 200 million (€25.6 million) within two years. The 2007 Hong Kong Stock Exchange IPO raised HKD 3.5 billion (€420 million): a record for a Chinese sports company at the time. The proceeds funded R&D infrastructure and national store expansion.

By 2009, ANTA had completed its first major acquisition: the FILA China licensing rights, covering Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau, purchased from Belle International. The consideration was based on the net asset value of the FILA China business at completion, capped at HK$600 million (€72 million). At the time, the FILA China entities had recorded combined net losses of approximately RMB 54 million (€7 million) across FY2007 and FY2008.

The 2012 inventory crisis across Chinese sportswear triggered a second pivot, from wholesale distribution to a retail-oriented DTC model.

The crisis was an industry-wide reckoning. Fueled by post-Olympics optimism, Li-Ning, Anta and rivals Peak and 361 Degrees opened more than 9,000 stores across mainland China between 2008 and 2011, an average of eight per day. When consumer demand slowed, the wholesale model that had enabled that expansion became a liability: orders moved from brands through distributors to franchisees, with no direct visibility into what was actually selling. In 2012, the industry entered a slump. All listed brands suffered sharp declines, with Li-Ning reporting a net loss of RMB 2 billion, according to China Daily.

ANTA’s response was structural: the company took direct control of its supply chain and channel operations, a capability that later became the advantage it applied to every subsequent acquisition. The Amer Sports acquisition in 2019, the largest cross-border sporting goods deal in history at the time of announcement, took this model global.

How the model works

One. The acquisition playbook.

ANTA acquires businesses that carry brand equity but are structurally loss-making or growth-constrained. FILA China was not profitable at the time of acquisition in 2009; Amer Sports was recording net losses exceeding $200 million annually before the deal closed.

In both cases, ANTA did not pay for current profitability. It paid for brand positioning and the option to deploy its distribution and DTC capabilities against the brand.

FILA turned profitable by 2014 and by FY2025 was generating RMB 28.5 billion in revenue at a 66.4 percent gross margin. Amer Sports recorded its first full-year net profit ($72.6 million) in FY2024 and grew revenue 26.7 percent to $6.6 billion in FY2025.

Two. The Greater China premium engine.

ANTA’s domestic infrastructure, including about 13,000 stores worldwide, 35.8 percent of group revenue from e-commerce, and deep tier-1 and tier-2 city presence built over 35 years, provides acquired international brands with distribution access to the world’s fastest-growing premium consumer market.

Greater China accounted for 27 percent of Amer Sports FY2025 revenue: $1,861.9 million, up 43.4 percent year-on-year. Five years earlier, in FY2021, it generated $372.9 million.

That trajectory reflects ANTA applying its retail knowledge to brands that had limited China presence at the time of acquisition. This is why we all watch the future of PUMA in that market so closely, now that it is backed by ANTA.

Three. The capital recycling loop.

ANTA uses consortium structures to distribute acquisition-stage financial risk. The Amer Sports deal involved €2.663 billion in equity from four investors (ANTA, FountainVest, Anamered Investments and Tencent) and €3 billion in debt financing, before being monetized through public listings.

The Amer Sports NYSE IPO in February 2024 raised approximately $1.57 billion in gross proceeds. A December 2024 follow-on offering raised a further $1.08 billion, which was used to repay outstanding debt.

By year-end 2025, Amer Sports’ net leverage had reduced to 0.3x adjusted EBITDA. By contrast, the Puma stake acquisition is financed entirely from ANTA’s internal cash reserves: about RMB 31.7 billion at year-end 2025.

Four. Brand independence as a retention mechanism.

ANTA always preserves the operational identity of acquired brands. Arc’teryx remains headquartered in North Vancouver. Salomon operates out of its Annecy design center. Wilson retains its Chicago heritage and multi-decade management continuity.

This is a structural choice aimed at avoiding the brand erosion that frequently follows acquisitions of premium assets. The value being acquired is the brand’s cultural authority; that authority is inseparable from its perceived independence.

By the numbers

Group revenue grew 62.6 percent between FY2021 and FY2025. Operating profit grew 73.7 percent over the same period, faster than revenue – meaning margin expansion, not just scale. The “All other brands” segment (Descente, Kolon Sport, Maia Active, Jack Wolfskin and others) grew 59.2 percent in FY2025 and now represents 21.2 percent of group revenue. This segment has the strongest structural growth runway.

One important caveat on profit:

ANTA’s FY2024 headline profit attributable to equity shareholders (RMB 15,596 million) was materially inflated by one-time gains from the Amer Sports IPO equity dilution event. Adjusted profit attributable, which strips out these non-recurring items, was RMB 11,729 million in FY2024 and RMB 12,385 million in FY2025 (+5.6 percent). Underlying profitability growth is solid, but more moderate than the headline five-year trajectory implies.

ANTA benefits from several structural tailwinds at once

In China, its primary growth market, two forces are converging. Rising household incomes in tier 1 and tier 2 cities have created a large premium sportswear consumer class. According to ANTA, the company’s market share in the Chinese sportswear market reached 21.8 percent in FY2025, up from 20.8 percent in FY2024.

Globally, the premium outdoor and technical apparel categories are expanding structurally. Amer Sports’ Greater China revenue has grown at a compound annual rate exceeding 50 percent since FY2021, rising from $372.9 million to $1,861.9 million in four years. This rate will moderate in the future, but the underlying trend that sees Chinese consumers treating Arc’teryx and Salomon as lifestyle premium brands, rather than niche technical equipment, is well established and structurally supported by the continued expansion of China’s middle class.

See also: ”The jacket and the mountain: what Arc’teryx’s Shanghai Museum is really selling”  

Secondary element, but significant: In basketball footwear, ANTA was the fastest growing brand on the secondary resale platform StockX in 2024, recording 1,901 percent year over year trade growth, according to StockX data from January 2025. The Kai 1, Kyrie Irving’s signature shoe, drove most of this momentum and accounted for three out of every four ANTA sales on StockX, according to Bloomberg. These are secondary market signals, not primary revenue data, but they serve as a leading indicator of Western brand awareness.

Do you want even more numbers about ANTA? Watch our EDM Expert Talk ”Can Anta help Puma win in China again?”

ANTA’s portfolio machine starts to pressure Western brands

At Milano Cortina 2026, ANTA demonstrated what multi-brand portfolio ownership looks like in competitive practice. Rather than relying on a single Olympic committee partnership, the group deployed a layered structure: the flagship ANTA brand outfitted ten Chinese national teams across core speed disciplines, while FILA China equipped the freestyle skiing aerials squad and Descente China supplied technical apparel for alpine skiing and snowboard halfpipe. The Hellenic Olympic Committee partnership extended that visibility beyond the Chinese delegation.

No single-brand Western competitor could execute this range of sponsorship layers from a single group.

The most direct implications for Western brands are clearest in China. In the three months ended February 28, 2025, Nike’s Greater China revenue declined 17%, while EBIT fell roughly 42%. These pressures are not solely attributable to ANTA—Nike’s challenges are structural—but the competitive shift is clear. Shelf space, marketing investment and consumer attention are increasingly flowing toward domestic brands, including ANTA’s portfolio.

For European brands, the impact is less immediate but potentially more consequential. ANTA’s stake in PUMA could provide deeper access to established distribution networks across Europe, Latin America, Africa and India, while strengthening its position as a global multi-brand operator. For PUMA, it could also create potential synergies in the Greater China market.

For retailers, the supplier equation is also changing. With RMB 31.7 billion (€4.0 billion) in net cash, strong free cash flow and no immediate reliance on external financing, ANTA now negotiates from a position of strength across multiple price tiers.

The structural asymmetry is increasingly visible. ANTA combines domestic scale in China with a portfolio of Western-origin premium brands and a capital model that emphasizes recycling and balance-sheet discipline. That combination remains difficult to replicate—and increasingly relevant for Europe.

The open questions

The Western consumers. ANTA’s premium presence in Western markets flows almost entirely through acquired brands. Arc’teryx is Canadian by origin, Salomon is French, Wilson is American and FILA is Italian. The core ANTA brand is not yet a viable consumer proposition in Europe or North America at scale. Its Beverly Hills flagship store opened in early 2025 and represents a milestone, but Western brand equity for the ANTA marque remains undeveloped.

The PUMA governance model. ANTA has no prior experience managing a company subject to German co-determination law. PUMA SE’s supervisory board includes employee representatives whose consent is required for major strategic decisions. ANTA has said it intends to seek “adequate representation” on PUMA’s supervisory board and has explicitly ruled out a full takeover offer. How ANTA’s “brand independence” operating model functions within this structure will need to be resolved after the acquisition receives final approval in 2026.

The Irving risk exposure. The All-Star NBA Kyrie Irving partnership has delivered visible commercial results, but Irving was dropped by Nike in 2022 after posting a social media link to an antisemitic film. Irving later apologized publicly. Still, many people do not forget. ANTA signed Irving in July 2023 to a five-year contract that includes the role of Chief Creative Officer of basketball. The reputational dimension of this decision remains a live exposure for a brand actively building Western consumer credibility and investor confidence on the NYSE.

The profit quality gap. ANTA’s FY2025 adjusted profit attributable to equity shareholders grew 5.6 percent to RMB 12,385 million (€1,590 million). That is a healthy business, but it is materially lower than the headline group revenue growth of 13.3 percent. Whether ANTA can translate revenue scale and operating efficiency into consistent double-digit adjusted earnings growth, rather than headline growth driven by acquisition gains, is the central question for long-term investors.

Excursus: is ANTA the new BYD?

ANTA’s trajectory is not an outlier. It fits a pattern that has repeated across sectors over the past decade, and reading it that way changes what you should expect next.

In electric vehicles, BYD went from a battery supplier to the world’s top-selling EV maker in 2025, surpassing Tesla with 2.26 million battery electric vehicles sold globally, up 28 percent year over year. Tesla sold 1.64 million, a second consecutive annual decline. A company many Western consumers still struggle to name now outproduces and outsells the brand that defined the category.

In batteries, CATL, founded in Ningde, Fujian in 2011, commands 37.9 percent of the global EV battery market (2024), its eighth consecutive year at number one. Its batteries power roughly one in three electric vehicles worldwide, including those made by Tesla, BMW, Mercedes-Benz and Volkswagen. No Western company is close

In drones, DJI, founded in Shenzhen in 2006, holds an estimated 70 percent of the global commercial drone market. In the US, its share exceeds 80 percent, even as Congress has repeatedly tried to restrict or ban its products on national security grounds. Legislation has not changed the basic competitive reality: DJI makes drones widely perceived as offering superior price-performance versus Western rivals.

The structural pattern is consistent across all three cases. A Chinese company starts as a manufacturer or component supplier. It learns the fundamentals of its industry from Western customers. It invests heavily in product development. Then it builds, or acquires, the brand position needed to compete at the top of the market.

The domestic Chinese market provides the scale advantage that makes pricing and iteration speed unmatched. International expansion follows: first through product quality, then through distribution and brand investment.

ANTA fits this pattern, with one important variation. BYD, CATL and DJI built their global positions under their own names. ANTA’s premium global presence still flows largely through acquired Western identities.

In that respect, ANTA resembles Haier more than BYD. In 2016, Haier bought GE Appliances, a brand founded in 1907, from General Electric for $5.6 billion. It kept the Louisville headquarters, preserved the management team, continued investing in US manufacturing and left the brand intact. Most American consumers have no idea GE Appliances is Chinese-owned. The acquisition worked precisely because Haier was invisible inside it.

This is ANTA’s playbook.

The harder question, and the one that will determine whether ANTA becomes more BYD than Haier over the next decade, is whether the ANTA main brand can build genuine consumer equity outside China. BYD’s global position rests on a product that competes on its own terms. ANTA’s global premium global position still rests on brands that predate its ownership. The Beverly Hills store, the Kai 1, the Milano Cortina Olympic presence: these are early experiments in building something new under the ANTA name. They are not yet proof it has worked.

What is clear is that the industrial logic behind this expansion is not specific to sportswear.

It is China’s second act in the global economy: moving from making things for Western brands to owning the brands themselves. In EVs, in batteries, in drones, in appliances, and now in sportswear, the question is no longer whether Chinese companies can compete at the top of the market. They already do. The question is how much further they intend to go.